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Abstract: This paper analyses the convergence of the Finnish economy to the monetary policy
regime of the EMU. We review the expectations on the effects of EMU membership which
prevailed before the union was established, and compare those with actual outcomes for Finland
in the first years of the EMU. It seems that the de facto membership in the new policy regime,
began approximately at the beginning of 1997. The significant improvement of some traditional
structural imbalances of the Finnish economy is reported. It is argued that the improvement of
monetary policy credibility can explain much of the improved performance of the economy. 
I INTRODUCTION 
T
he purpose of this paper is to study the possible effects of EMU
membership on the Finnish economy and economic policy. In particular,
we want to consider to what extent prior expectations regarding these effects
were corroborated by later developments. The paper considers the question,
when EMU membership began to influence the performance of the Finnish
economy. Moreover, I review the hopes and expectations which were held
about the membership. Finally, the actual developments since monetary
integration are summarised and interpreted.
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juha.tarkka@bof.fiAt the time of writing this paper, the third stage of EMU, with common
monetary policy, is three years old, and so is Finland’s membership in it. As
such, this is too short a time to allow any firm conclusions on the effects of the
monetary union on the Finnish economy. However, I will argue that by late-
2001, we already have almost five years of experience of the effects of a
common monetary policy on the Finnish economy. This makes it possible to
compare, tentatively at least, predictions made before the membership to the
later developments and to present some empirically based conjectures about
their relevance and accuracy.
Our preliminary review of the developments suggests that the
microeconomic and structural effects of the EMU membership have been
particularly strong. EMU appears to have increased the efficiency and
openness of the enterprise sector of the economy, and to have improved the
general stability of the whole economy in the process. This may be at least
partly due to an improvement in the credibility of monetary policy, compared
to Finnish historical experience.  
II WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THE FINNISH EMU MEMBERSHIP?
It is generally agreed that the Finnish decision to join the monetary union
was not motivated by economic considerations alone. Political motives had an
important role as well. An important one was to maximise the country’s
political presence and influence in Europe, if possible. The country wanted to
be part of the “inner circle” of European Union, if that kind of club were to
emerge inside the EU. Economic considerations were also quite important,
however. They reflected frustration with the country’s economic instability in
the previous decades, as well as the experience of the severe economic crisis,
which Finland experienced in the early 1990s. 
The contemporary discussion indicates that EMU membership was seen to
involve both economic benefits and some risks. An official Ministry of Finance
report of September 1996, written just before Finland joined EU’s exchange
rate mechanism (ERM), is representative of the thinking in policy circles at
the time (Ministry of Finance, 1996). A more thorough discussion is found in
the report of the expert group commissioned by the Prime Minister and
chaired by Dr Jukka Pekkarinen (Finland and EMU, 1997). This report was
submitted in April 1997. Both of these reports are broadly similar in their
analysis of the most important effects of the prospective membership, and they
summarise well the “mainstream view” which prevailed in Finland at the
time. Important outside influences to the Finnish policy debate were also the
report of the Swedish official EMU committee (SOU, 1996), as well as the “One
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However, for our purposes the outside reports are mainly important only
because they facilitate the interpretation of the Finnish discussion.
The expected effects, according to these above mentioned Finnish policy
reports, can be summarised as follows.
2.1. Macroeconomic Benefits Resulting from Improved Credibility of 
Monetary Policy
Finnish monetary policy had traditionally suffered from lack of credibility.
This had caused recurrent balance of payments problems and created large
risk premiums in market interest rates. Not only nominal, but also real
interest rates had been higher on average than in Germany, for example. It
was anticipated that in EMU, the credibility of monetary policy would
probably be better than what Finland had been able to achieve in the past.
Therefore, it was expected that the rates of interest, especially long-term
rates, would be lower in Finland if the country would join the monetary union.
Lower and more stable long-term interest rates would in turn increase
investment and have a positive effect on economic growth. 
Monetary union was also predicted to be conducive to wage moderation,
because better credibility implies lower inflation expectations and therefore
smaller “inflation premiums” in wage contracts. This would reduce cost-push
inflation in the economy and improve competitiveness and employment. This
was also a very attractive prospect because part of the traditional Finnish
instability problem had been the gradual deterioration of the country’s
competitiveness as a result of high wage increases. Incomes policy, which had
been used to combat this problem for decades, had not been completely
successful and the exchange rate had had to be devalued from time to time to
restore competitiveness. 
2.2. Macroeconomic Effects of Giving Up Independent Monetary Policy
The shift from national to common monetary policy invokes the well-
known problem of asymmetric shocks: if the member countries do not
constitute an optimum currency area, common monetary policy cannot be
expected to react to the shocks they face as effectively as national monetary
policies could. To the extent that national monetary policies or exchange rate
movements do in fact facilitate adjustment to asymmetric (i.e. country-
specific) shocks, a country may have to face more severe economic fluctuations
if it forsakes its national currency. 
This problem was discussed extensively in Finland when the country was
preparing for membership in the monetary union. Both of the above
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Finland and the rest of the EU did not fulfil the criteria for an optimum
currency area particularly well (see also Tarkka and Akerholm, 1993).
Therefore, the difficulty of adjusting to asymmetric shocks without national
money was considered as the main risk in the EMU membership. However, it
was also noted that having a separate exchange rate was not only an
adjustment mechanism but also a source of speculative disturbances, and this
source of shocks at least would be eliminated in EMU. 
Both of the Finnish policy reports attached some weight to the argument
that a more counter-cyclical fiscal policy could at least partly compensate for
the loss of independent monetary policy. They also argued that the effects of
fiscal policy on economic activity would be stronger in the monetary union
than on the outside. This would be the case because there would be no
crowding out effects through interest rate or balance-of-payments reactions to
the fiscal balance. It was noted, however, that smoothing economic
fluctuations by fiscal policy required very strong public finances on average, in
the spirit of the later Stability and Growth Pact. 
Finally, regarding the asymmetric nature of cyclical fluctuations, it was
pointed out that the correlation of the business cycles was not invariant to the
monetary arrangements between countries. So, if Finland would join the
monetary union, its economic fluctuations might become more correlated with
the other member countries. 
2.3. Structural Effects and Efficiency Benefits from a Single Currency
Joining the common currency was generally predicted to reduce
transaction costs and increase competition. It would, therefore, make Finland
better integrated to the European single market. It was predicted to give
firms, households, and governments access to deeper and more efficient
financial markets. These changes were believed to accelerate structural
change in the production sector and in financial services. Scope for
international diversification of portfolios would increase. Ultimately, these
changes were thought to mean cost savings and higher productivity growth.
The openness of the economy would naturally increase. 
Other microeconomic and “structural” effects were also predicted to result
from joining the monetary union. In the Finnish discussion, adopting the
common currency was often described as “giving up the option to devalue”.
This was seen as a serious challenge, since in the past, large devaluations had
repeatedly been necessary. The country had resorted to large devaluations of
its currency in 1957, 1967, 1977-78, 1982, and 1991, not to mention the
floating of the currency in 1992. 
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option to devalue” would require more effective cost control in the economy
than before, more flexible labour markets, and stronger capital positions than
before for firms and financial institutions. 
On the other hand, the loss of the “devaluation option” was seen to be
potentially beneficial. There existed a long-standing criticism among Finnish
economists of the “devaluation-inflation cycle” which had been embedded into
expectations and in the behaviour of firms and labour unions alike. Far from
being neutral in terms of the real economy, it was argued, the accommodative
exchange rate policy encouraged inefficient industrial investment because
devaluations in recessions shifted the downside of the firms’ profit uncertainty
to their creditors and workers. All in all, it was believed to have introduced
powerful moral hazard effects into the investment decisions of export
industries, in particular. The critics blamed this aspect of the traditional
Finnish economic policy for many of the structural problems the country had
suffered from, such as high investment rates relative to growth, and the
chronic weakness of the current account. It was believed that giving up the
option to devalue would make the economy much more efficient, especially in
its use of capital investment (see e.g. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen, 1993). 
This argument, which had been present in the policy debate in various
forms since the 1970s, suffered a temporary setback at least in the beginning
of the 1990s. At that time, the efforts of the Bank of Finland to maintain a
fixed parity between the markka and the ECU failed as a result of a severe
economic crisis and ended in a devaluation in November 1991, and floating of
the currency in September 1992. The attempts to focus monetary policy
directly on the exchange rate were abandoned and an inflation targeting
regime was adopted instead (in February 1993).
III POLICY CONVERGENCE BEFORE 1999 
Before starting to search for evidence of the effects of the EMU
membership from time series data, one must ask when these effects might
have begun to materialise. “After the country joined the EMU” is not a good
answer, because expectations of joining in the common currency influenced
monetary policy and private behaviour already some time before membership
was realised. 
Officially, Finland became a member of the third stage of EMU on
January 1, 1999 when the union became a reality in the sense of permanently
locked exchange rates and single monetary policy. The effects of monetary
integration did not begin as late as that, however. In reality, Finnish monetary
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countries of the emerging monetary union already in the preceding years. This
convergence was actually strong enough so that there were no significant
changes in interest rates, exchange rates, or other indicators of monetary
conditions when the monetary union was finally completed. At least in terms
of monetary policy, then, the beginning of the third stage of the EMU on
January 1, 1999 was merely a seal on a process that had in fact taken place
already some time before that. 
Finland joined the EU from the beginning of 1995. At that time, the
Finnish markka was floating after a severe economic crisis, which had hit the
country in 1991. Monetary policy aimed at the domestic inflation target (which
was defined as an upper limit of 2 per cent on a measure of underlying
inflation), so that in principle the monetary regime of the country was quite
independent of its EU partners. The new government, which was formed after
the general elections held in March 1995, proclaimed in its programme that its
goal was to prepare Finland to join the EMU in the first group of countries
doing so. This goal implied that stability of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the
future EMU partner countries was desirable in itself. In theory, there might
have been a trade-off between exchange rate stability and achieving the
inflation target, but this turned out not to be the case in practice. The
exchange rate vis-à-vis the deutschmark, which had been quite volatile in the
previous years, was stabilised to a great extent after the beginning of 1995,
while the inflation target was also achieved (i.e. the underlying inflation rate
was kept well below the announced target.).
The strengthening of the markka in the two years preceding 1995 is very
remarkable (Figure 1). However, that has to be seen against the background
of the drastic depreciation which occurred in 1991 and 1992, and the very low
credibility of monetary and fiscal policies which prevailed at that time. As the
credibility of macroeconomic policies started to improve in 1993 and the
following years, that was reflected in the exchange rate. The most important
ingredients in the improvement of credibility were the Central Bank’s
inflation target, instituted in the Spring of 1993, and the medium-term budget
consolidation programmes which also were committed at that time. A third
important element was the increasing likelihood of the Finnish EU and EMU
membership over the same period. By 1995, the markka exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the deutschmark had converged to a level which – some transitory
fluctuations notwithstanding – later proved sustainable and consistent with
non-inflationary growth. 
The decisive year for monetary convergence of Finland with its future
EMU partners was 1996. During that year, monetary policy interest rates
were brought very close to those of Germany and the other “core” countries,
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Finland joined the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). After that, exchange rate
fluctuations vis-à-vis the deutschmark diminished further to the extent that
they became quite unimportant from the macroeconomic point of view,
although the ERM agreement would have allowed rather wide fluctuations, in
principle (up to ±15 per cent). By the end of 1997, exchange rate movements
vis-à-vis  the deutschmark had virtually ended. 
Figure 1: FIM/DEM Exchange Rate
Note: monthly ERM central  rate
Source: Bank of Finland
As a result of these developments, Finnish monetary policy could be
considered as practically “harmonised”, both in terms of interest rate
convergence and exchange rate stability, by late 1996. However, a de facto
membership in a monetary union does not consist only of the harmonisation of
actual policies, but also the adjustment of market expectations to the fact that
policy will remain harmonised also in the future. One can evaluate the degree
of this confidence by looking at two indicators, the long-term interest rates,
and the foreign exchange interventions required to keep the exchange rate
stable. 
The yield differential of Finnish 10-year bonds vis-à-vis their German
counterparts declined strongly in 1996, and by the beginning of 1997 it was
below 40 basis points, i.e. no larger than the yield differentials later recorded
for some countries inside the EMU (Figure 2). Developments in the foreign
exchange markets also suggest that the beginning of 1997 was a watershed for
the market expectations. In the third week of January 1997, the last attack on
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investors bought very large amounts of the Finnish markka, speculating on a
possible appreciation of the currency. After quite large interventions by the
Bank of Finland, the market calmed down, however. In fact, after January
1997 there were no signs of any lack of confidence on the future entry of
Finland to the EMU, at the prevailing parity vis-à-vis the deutschmark.
Figure 2: Finnish Interest Rate Differential over Germany
Note: Absolute difference in interest rates in percentage points.
3 months rate 10 year rate
Source: Reuters.
We can, therefore, conclude that most of the impact of EMU on private
behaviour was probably felt already in the beginning of 1997, and that point
of time is likely to be a good benchmark against which to gauge the
development of various economic indicators.
IV WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?
We can now try and look at the data in order to see how well expectations
of the effects of EMU membership are beginning to materialise. I will present
some selective evidence of this in the same order in which I discussed the
expectations. 
Turning first to credibility of monetary policy, it seems that the promise of
lower interest rates has indeed become a reality. The significant improvement
in the general government financial position (see Figure 3) could offer an
alternative explanation, but real interest differentials were high also in the
168 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW1980s when the government debt was quite small. This supports the
conclusion that credibility of monetary policy has indeed improved from the
Finnish perspective.
Figure 3: General Government Deficit/Surplus
Note: Maastricht definition.
Source: Statistics Finland.
Wage moderation too has been remarkably good, in terms of the
profitability and external competitiveness of the economy. Real wages have
increased by less than productivity. On the other hand, unemployment has
remained high, so by that standard, the performance of the labour markets
has not been so favourable (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Labour Market Performance
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Note: Unit labour costs annual, per cent.
Unemployment rate, per cent, year average.
Source: Statistics Finland.Considering the question of asymmetric shocks next, it is the general
impression that Finland has experienced a very powerful asymmetric shock in
the period since late 1996. This has taken the form of an IT boom, which has
been much stronger in Finland than in the Euro area on average. As a result,
Finnish GDP growth has exceeded the growth performance of all its EMU
partners with the exception of Ireland. On the other hand, the rhythm of the
fluctuations in industry has become remarkably similar to the Euro area
average. This is evident both in the index of industrial production (Figure 5)
and especially in the industrial confidence indicator compiled by the European
Commission (Figure 6). 
Figure 5: Industrial Production
Note: Euro area, left scale Finland, right scale
Source: Statistics Finland.
Figure 6: Industrial Confidence Indicator
Note: Euro area Finland
Source: European Commission.
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ultimately tested in a recession. After growing very fast for several years, the
Finnish economy moved to a recession in 2001. It is naturally too early to say
with certainty, however, how the economy will weather the recession as a
member of the monetary union. 
Fiscal policy doctrine does not seem to have changed into more
“Keynesian” in the sense of being geared towards smoothing aggregate
economic fluctuations although this was sometimes anticipated or even
advocated in the pre EMU debate. It is true that the government financial
surplus has been exceptionally high after the EMU membership but this is
probably more due to the recognised need to prepare for the future increase in
pension outlays, which are only partly funded, than to any discretionary
attempts to fine-tune the economy by demand management. According to
forecasts, the Finnish population will be ageing faster in the next couple of
decades than that of most other European countries. Even the direct impact of
the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal policy was probably limited, because
the government surpluses were so large that there seemed to be little
probability of the Pact really binding Finnish fiscal policy in the foreseeable
future. Also, the medium-term fiscal programmes had been fairly ambitious in
terms of debt reduction already since 1993, even though the Stability and
Growth Pact was not in existence at that time (it was agreed in the
Amsterdam council in 1997). 
Having considered these “macroeconomic” effects of the monetary union,
we can now turn to consider what were classified above as “structural” and
microeconomic effects. 
One expected development which seems not to have happened is the
general acceleration in the growth of labour productivity. Labour productivity
has been growing, but at rates close to historical average. However, a dramatic
acceleration in it has occurred in recent years in some parts of manufacturing
industry, particularly electronics (see Forsman, 2000 and Jalava, 2001 for
details). 
One significant development has been the increase in the openness of the
economy (Figure 7). This has taken place at several levels. The share of
exports in GDP has increased, but the change has been especially dramatic in
the financial markets. Capital account developments since the beginning of
1997 indicate very rapid internationalisation on the Finnish capital markets.
The most significant phenomena in the structure of external capital flows over
the period 1997-2001 have been the very rapid growth of outward portfolio
investments and direct investment especially after the EMU membership was
completed in 1999. This has been possible since the country has been running
very large current account surpluses since 1995. The improvement of the
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current account surpluses since the markka became a convertible currency in
1958. Moreover, the surpluses have been recorded at a time when economic
growth is fast; previously, periods of fast economic growth had typically been
associated with large external deficits.
Figure 7: Openness of the Economy: Exports/GDP, Per Cent
Note: Quarterly data.
Source: Statistics Finland.
Figure 8: Growth and the Current Account
Note: Annual data.
Current account balance/GDP, %            GDP, % change
Source: Statistics Finland and Bank of Finland.
The increase in foreign direct investment has coincided with a sharp
improvement in the profitability of export industries and a decline in their
domestic fixed investment (in relation to their value added). The period has
also seen the emergence of Finnish multinational companies in an un-
172 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWprecedented scale, led by Nokia, the mobile phone manufacturer (for more
details on the recently very important role of the ICT sector in the Finnish
economy, see e.g. Forsman (2000)). Much of the Finnish FDI abroad has been
in the form of takeovers (especially in forest industries) whereas in the
telecommunication equipment there has also been a lot of greenfield
investment. At the same time as Finnish investment abroad has grown
remarkably, foreign participation in the Finnish stock market has reached
unprecedented proportions. Foreign residents owned over 70 per cent of the
total market capitalisation of the Helsinki Exchanges in the beginning of
2001. 
However, this internationalisation of the capital market cannot be directly
accounted for by Finland’s EMU membership. A large part of the foreign
ownership of Finnish shares is by investors who are not Euro area residents;
also the foreign direct investment is to a large extent to non-EMU countries.
The component most significantly influenced by the EMU membership is the
foreign portfolio investment by Finnish pension funds. The funds have been
running exceptionally large surpluses in the last years (in the order of 3 per
cent of GDP). The increase in the foreign security portfolios of the pension
funds has been much larger than their surpluses, however, indicating the
efforts of the funds to diversify their portfolios under EMU. Before the EMU
membership, prudential restrictions which limit the ability of pension funds to
invest in foreign currency denominated assets severely limited their
diversification possibilities. 
The historically unique improvement of the current account position of the
Finnish economy (see Figure 8) has been associated with another parallel
development: a dramatic decrease in the ratio of investment to GDP
(Figure 9). Considering the very high growth rates, which have been achieved
concurrently with the decrease in the investment ratio, it appears that the
productivity of fixed capital has improved significantly. An interesting aspect
of this is that the investment rate has remained low even though real interest
rates have declined markedly after Finland’s convergence to the stability
oriented monetary policy regime.
At the same time as investment rate has declined and the outward direct
investment has increased in the Finnish enterprise sector, a third important
change has also taken place. The indebtedness of enterprises has been
reduced. This is evident from the fact that the debt-equity ratio of 500 largest
Finnish firms has declined from about 300 per cent to little over 100 per cent
by the latter half of the 1990s (Figure 10).
One possible explanation of these structural changes – improved efficiency
of investment, improvement in the external balance of the economy, and
improvement in the capital adequacy of the enterprises is that the previous
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problems to industry. EMU may have alleviated these, and this hypothesis is
supported by the evidence on long-term real rates which suggests that the
credibility of monetary policy has indeed improved.
Figure 9: Growth and the Investment Rate
Note: Annual data.
GDP, % change                Fixed investment/GDP, % (right scale)
Source: Statistics Finland.
Figure 10: Debt–Equity Ratio of Large Finnish Firms, Per Cent
Note: Computed from the published balance sheets of 500 largest non-financial companies.
Database maintained by ETLA, Helsinki.
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Before trying to reach any even tentative conclusions about the effects of
EMU on the Finnish economy, some caveats are in place. There are many
reasons why its is very difficult to disentangle the effects of giving up national
monetary policy and joining the EMU from the economic developments in
Finland since 1997 or 1999. This is because a number of other factors besides
the monetary union have influenced the economy over the period in question. 
One reason is that when Finland joined the EMU, the country had just
recovered from a very severe economic and financial crisis, which had changed
the structure of the economy in several ways. Therefore, the effects of the
EMU membership are mixed and intertwined with the effects of the crisis,
such as the large depreciation of the currency, a sudden increase of
government debt, emergence of severe unemployment, and large
reorganisations in Finnish banking and industry in the form of domestic and
international mergers and acquisitions as well as privatisations. 
Another factor, which makes it difficult to isolate the effects of EMU, is the
huge and contemporaneous impact of the “new economy” in Finland. Since
1997, the Finnish economic performance has been dominated by the
exceptional growth of the high-tech electronics industry in the country. Much
of the phenomenon has been due to the success of a single firm, Nokia, which
by the end of the 1990s emerged as the world’s largest producer of mobile
phones (see Forsman, 2000). Because the ICT boom of the late 1990s was so
strong in Finland, and because it coincided with the convergence of monetary
policy to EMU, the effects of the new monetary regime are hard to distinguish
from technology-related changes in the economy. 
Yet another non-monetary reason why the economy has changed in the
1990s is Finland’s EU membership as such. Finland joined the EU from the
beginning of 1995, and this may have altered the behaviour of the economy in
ways, which coincide with, but are not directly caused by the EMU
membership. For example, joining the Common Agricultural Policy was a
change that may have altered the inflation dynamics of the Finnish economy
to a significant extent. Under national agricultural policy, which was
characterised by even higher protection than that of the EU, consumer prices
of foodstuffs were more sensitive to domestic costs than is the case in the
common market. Joining the common agricultural policy did therefore
probably weaken the mechanisms, which had previously fed the “price-cost
spiral” in Finland. Perhaps even more importantly, the Single Market
programme in itself may have had a positive effect on the ability of Finnish
firms to gain market shares in the larger EU countries.
After all these caveats and reservations, one can make some preliminary
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credibility of monetary policy. In so far as the traditional Finnish problem of
inflationary pressure and eroding competitiveness has been due to insufficient
credibility of monetary policy, the outlook for price stability and
competitiveness should be better than the inflation history of the country has
been. So far, the record is encouraging. The Finnish inflation rate, which was
brought under control during the inflation targeting regime before the EMU
membership, has not deviated too much from the EMU average after 1999,
even though there was some divergence in 2000. In this connection its should
be noted that simple cross-country comparisons of headline inflation rates (or
even the “harmonised” concepts) cannot be relied on to indicate whether an
EMU member has an idiosyncratic inflation problem or not. Because of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect, the convergence of inflation rates must be
considered against the background of productivity differentials. The
exceptionally high productivity increases achieved in the Finnish
manufacturing sector in the 1990s suggest that inflation differentials may be
very poor indicators of changes in the competitive position of the Finnish
economy, especially when the years of the ICT boom are considered.
Although much of the debate before joining revolved around the problem
of asymmetric shocks, our preliminary review of the developments suggests
that the microeconomic and structural effects of the EMU membership may
have been more important. Thus, the problems of asymmetric fluctuations
have not been at the forefront in Finnish economic policy, whereas the
structural change has been dramatic. EMU appears to have increased the
efficiency and openness of the enterprise sector of the economy, and to have
improved the general stability of the whole economy in the process. As a result
of that, and also because of the structural surplus which has prevailed in
general government finances, the EMU has not posed any particular
challenges for Finnish fiscal policy either: there has been no serious
temptation to activate Keynesian-type discretionary policies, nor has the
Stability and Growth Pact had any constraining effect on the stance of fiscal
policy. This is not to say that the Pact has had no effect. It has re-enforced the
political commitment to sound finances in the country – and should also
safeguard the country against monetary instability which might otherwise
emanate from the other member countries if they were not following
sustainable fiscal policies.
All in all, the Finnish EMU membership seems in its first years to have
fulfilled most of its promises and avoided most of the risks. The structural
effects appear to have been favourable, as predicted, and there is no evidence
that the stability properties of the economy should have become worse, rather
the opposite. Clearly, however, more time has to pass and the performance of
176 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWthe economy over a full economic cycle has to be observed before any definite
conclusions on these issues can be attempted. 
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